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In this paper, we argue that, although Wittgenstein’s reservations on Gödel's 
interpretation of his own formal reasoning are, indeed, of historical 
importance, the uneasiness that academicians and philosophers continue to 
sense, and express, over standard interpretations of Gödel's formal reasoning - 
even seventy years after the publication of his seminal 1931 paper - is of much 
greater significance, and relevance, to us today. 
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1.  Introduction 
In their paper “A note on Wittgenstein's ‘notorious paragraph’ about the Gödel 
Theorem”1 [FP00], Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam draw attention to Wittgenstein’s 
remarks2 ([Wi78], Appendix III §8): 
I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have constructed a proposition (I 
will use ‘P’ to designate it) in Russell’s symbolism, and by means of certain 
definitions and transformations it can be so interpreted that it says: ‘P is not provable 
in Russell’s system.’ Must I not say that this proposition on the one hand is true, and 
on the other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; then it is true that it is 
provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it is proved that it is not 
provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable.”  
                                               
1 Downloadable PDF file. 
 
2 In footnote 9, Floyd and Putnam [FP00] note that: The “notorious” paragraph RFM I Appendix III §8 was 
penned on 23 September 1937, when Wittgenstein was in Norway (see the Wittgenstein papers, CD Rom, 
Oxford University Press and the University of Bergen, 1998, Item 118 (Band XIV), pp. 106ff). 
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Just as we ask, “‘Provable’ in what system?,” so we must also ask, “‘True’ in what 
system?” “True in Russell’s system” means, as was said, proved in Russell’s system, 
and “false in Russell’s system” means the opposite has been proved in Russell’s 
system.--Now what does your “suppose it is false” mean? In the Russell sense it 
means, “suppose the opposite is proved in Russell’s system”; if that is your 
assumption you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. 
And by “this interpretation” I understand the translation into this English sentence. --
If you assume that the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that means it is 
true in the Russell sense, and the interpretation “P is not provable” again has to be 
given up. If you assume that the proposition is true in the Russell sense, the same 
thing follows. Further: if the proposition is supposed to be false in some other than 
the Russell sense, then it does not contradict this for it to be proved in Russell’s 
system. (What is called “losing” in chess may constitute winning in another game.) 
Floyd and Putnam then argue that this paragraph contains a “philosophical claim of great 
interest which”: 
 ... is simply this: if one assumes (and, a fortiori if one actually finds out) that ~P is 
provable in Russell’s system one should ... give up the “translation” of P by the 
English sentence “P is not provable”. 
In this paper, we argue that, although Wittgenstein’s reservations on Gödel's 
interpretation of his own formal reasoning are, indeed, of historical importance, the 
uneasiness that academicians and philosophers such as Floyd and Putnam continue to 
sense, and express, over standard (text-book) interpretations of Gödel's formal reasoning 
- even seventy years after the publication of his seminal 1931 paper [Go31a] - is of much 
greater significance, and relevance, to us today. 
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In a set of related, unpublshed, papers3, we argue that standard interpretations of 
foundational concepts of classical mathematical theory may be implicitly influenced by, 
and built upon, some of Gödel's questionable interpretations of his own formal 
reasoning4; hence such interpretations can be argued as being, prima facie, either 
ambiguous, or non-constructive, or both.  
We now argue further that Wittgenstein’s reservations, and Floyd and Putnam’s 
uneasiness, can - and arguably must, as we advocate in this paper - be seen as indicating 
specific points of such ambiguity that need to be addressed on philosophical grounds, 
rather than dismissed on technicalities. 
2.  What is mathematics? 
2.1  Mathematics as a set of formal languages 
Without attempting to address the issue in its broader dimensions, we take Wittgenstein’s 
remarks as implicitly indicating that mathematics is to be considered simply as a set of 
formal languages. 
Any language of such a set, say Peano Arithmetic PA5 (or Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica, PM, or ZFC6), expresses - in a finite, unambiguous, and 
communicable manner - relations between concepts7 that are external to the language PA 
                                               
3 [An02a] to [An03g]. 
 
4 For instance, see [An02c], §4.4 and §4.5, and §5 of [An03b]. 
 
5 By “PA”, or “standard PA”, we mean the formal first order theory S defined by Mendelson ([Me64], 
p102-3). 
 
6 We assume that “PM” and “ZFC” are familiar terms; the precise definitions of these formal languages is 
not relevant to the arguments of this paper. 
 
7 For reasons that should become clearer later, we prefer the term “concepts” to the term “entities”; we 
intend to define some mathematical concepts as “mathematical objects”, where some “concept” may not 
represent what we would intuitively term as an “entity”. 
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(or to PM, or to ZFC). Each such language is, thus, essentially two-valued8, since a 
relation9 either holds or does not hold externally (relative to the language).  
Further, a selected, finite, number of primitive formal assertions10 about a finite set of 
selected primitive relations of, say, PA are defined as axiomatically PA-provable; all 
other assertions about relations that can be effectively11 defined in terms of the primitive 
relations are termed as PA-provable if, and only if, there is a finite sequence of assertions 
of PA, each of which is either a primitive assertion, or which can effectively be 
determined in a finite number of steps as an immediate consequence of any two 
assertions preceding it in the sequence by a finite set of rules of consequence. 
2.2  An interpretation must be an effectively decidable translation 
An effective interpretation12 of a language such as PA into another language, say PM (or 
ZFC, or even English), is essentially the specification of an effective method by which 
any assertion of PA is translated unambiguously into a unique assertion of PM (or ZFC, 
or English). Clearly, if a relation is provable in PA, then it should be effectively decidable 
in any interpretation of PA - since a finite proof sequence of PA would, prima facie, 
translate as a finite proof sequence in the interpretation. 
                                               
8 We discuss the significance of this later in the section §4.2 on omega-consistency. 
 
9 The term “relation” is thus treated as a primitive, undefined mathematical concept. 
 
10 We prefer the term “formal assertion” to the familiar terms “formal sentence”, or ”formal proposition”, 
since a paradigm shift is involved in interpreting the expression “[(Ax)F(x)]” constructively. For 
convenience, we may also refer to a “formal assertion” as an “assertion”, where the intention is clear from 
the context. 
 
11 “Effectively” means by some finite, unambiguous, mechanical procedure (cf. [Me64], p 207).  
 
12 We sometimes use the term “interpretation” as a noun in its commonly understood sense, and sometimes 
in a mathematical sense as in this instance; Mendelson ([Me64], §2, p49) gives the more precise, classical, 
definition of the term when used in a mathematical sense. Unless specified otherwise, whether the term is 
to be understood generally, or in its mathematical sense, is determined by the context. 
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2.3  Is the converse necessarily true? 
The question arises: If an assertion is decidable in an interpretation M of PA, then does 
such decidability translate into an effective method of decidability in PA? 
Obviously, such a question can only be addressed unambiguously if there is an effective 
method for determining whether an assertion is decidable in M. If there is no such 
effective method, then we are faced with the following thesis that is implicit in, and 
central to, Wittgenstein’s “notorious” remark: 
If there is no effective method for the unambiguous decidability of assertions in a 
language, then it is not a meaningful mathematical language. 
In other words, in the absence of an effective method of decidability in M, any 
correlation of a PA-assertion with an assertion in M is essentially arguable, and it is 
meaningless to ask whether an assertion of PA is decidable under interpretation in M or 
not (the question of whether the assertion is decidable in PA or not is, then, an issue of 
secondary consequence). 
2.4  Tarskian truth under the standard interpretation 
The philosophical dimensions of this thesis emerge if we take M as the standard, 
arithmetical, interpretation of PA, where [Me64]: 
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain, 
(b) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the symbol “0” of PA, 
(c) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the “ ' ” function 
(i.e. of f11), 
(d) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of “+” and “.“, 
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(e) the interpretation of the predicate letter “=” is the equality relation. 
Now, post-Gödel, the standard interpretation of classical theory seems to be that: 
(f) PA can, indeed, be interpreted in M;  
(g) assertions in M are decidable by Tarski’s definitions of satisfiability and truth (cf. 
[Me64], p49-53); 
(h) Tarskian truth and satisfiability are, however, not effectively verifiable in M13. 
However, the question, implicit in Wittgenstein’s argument regarding the possibility of a 
semantic contradiction in Gödel's reasoning, then arises:  
How can we assert that a PA-assertion (whether such an assertion is PA-provable or 
not) is true under interpretation in M, so long as such truth remains effectively 
unverifiable in M? 
Since the issue is not resolved unambiguously by Gödel in his 1931 paper (nor, 
apparently, by subsequent standard interpretations of his formal reasoning and 
conclusions), Wittgenstein’s remark can be taken to argue that, although we may validly 
draw various conclusions from Gödel’s formal reasoning and conclusions, the existence 
of a true or false assertion of M cannot be amongst them. 
3.  What is PA? 
3.1  Is PA an interpretation of its standard interpretation? 
A related philosophical issue is, then, the question:  
                                               
13 We take this as the interpretation of Tarski’s 1936 Theorem (cf. [Me64], Corollary 3.38, p151): The set 
Tr of Gödel-numbers of wfs of PA which are true in the standard model is not arithmetical, i.e. there is no 
wf A(x) of PA such that Tr is the set of numbers k for which A(x) is true in the standard model. 
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Is PA an interpretation of its standard interpretation M?  
In other words, since PA is intended to formalise our intuitive arithmetic M as expressed 
by Dedekind in his formulation of the Peano Postulates, do we accept that PA must be an 
interpretation of M?14  
(The standard response to this question seems to lie at the heart of Wittgenstein’s 
reservations, and to be the cause of the uneasiness felt by subsequent philosophers who 
question the standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory.) 
Now, a negative answer would imply that PA cannot be taken as a faithful formalisation 
of our intuitive, Dedekind, arithmetic; so, either (as standard interpretations of Gödel's 
reasoning and conclusions implicitly imply) such arithmetic is not formalisable in 
principle, or there is some interpretation of M that formalises M more faithfully. 
The former is, intuitively, an unappealing, Platonic, and implicitly self-limiting, 
admission; the latter, an unacceptable reflection on the competence of mathematicians to 
adequately select an appropriate set of primitive, axiomatic, assertions for PA as may be 
needed for PA to be an effective, and unambiguous, language of precise communication. 
An affirmative answer, on the other hand, whilst validating PA as a formalisation of our 
intuitive, Dedekind arithmetic, would further imply that, since an assertion would then be 
effectively decidable in PA only if it were effectively decidable in M, there must be some 
effective method of defining Tarskian satisfiability and truth in M. 
                                               
14 We note that, prima facie, a strict formalist doctrine would avoid addressing this question; in other 
words, it would accept PA as a standard formalisation of intuitive arithmetic, but treat both the possible 
relationship of PA to the parent system that gave it birth, and the significance of the thesis “PA is a 
standard formalisation of intuitive arithmetic”, as being of no mathematical significance for the study of PA 
as a formal system, and of its interpretations. 
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3.2  Defining effective satisfiability and truth 
Although Wittgenstein does not appear to have attempted such a definition - possibly as it 
may have seemed to involve technicalities beyond the scope of his reflections - we note 
in §5.1 of Anand [An02c] that such an effective method is, indeed, made available to us 
by, curiously, a constructive interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions; an 
interpretation that is, ironically, more in sympathy with Wittgenstein’s constructive 
approach than Gödel’s Platonic one. 
3.3  Undecidability in PA 
Now, the thesis of a constructive interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions 
([An02c], §5.1) is that we may not interpret, for instance, the meta-assertion “PA proves: 
[(Ax)F(x)]15” as the non-verifiable, Tarskian meta-assertion: 
F(x) is satisfied by any given element x of the domain of M16. 
We must interpret it, instead, as the verifiable meta-assertion: 
There is a uniform effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) such that, given any 
element x of the domain of M, it will effectively decide that F(x) is satisfied in M.  
It follows that the meta-assertion, that PA does not prove [(Ax)F(x)], interprets 
constructively as the meta-assertion: 
                                               
15 We use square brackets to indicate that the expression within the brackets is to be treated as an 
abbreviation for an uninterpreted string of a formal system; we use double quotes to indicate that the 
expression inside the quotes is to be treated as an abbreviation for an interpreted expression in some 
mathematical language. 
 
16 Although standard interpretations of classical theory do not appear to highlight this point, this definition 
implicitly implies that every element of the domain of M (which, by our definition of the language M, 
would be considered external to M) is necessarily expressible in M. 
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There is no uniform effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) such that, given 
any element x of M, it will effectively decide that F(x) is satisfied in M. 
Consequently, a constructive interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions implies 
that there can be no undecidable assertions in PA; in other words, that PA is syntactically 
complete! 
4.  Standard interpretations of Gödel's reasoning 
4.1 How definitive is the standard interpretation of Gödel's reasoning? 
However, we are, then, immediately faced with the question: Since the standard 
interpretation of Gödel's reasoning and conclusions asserts that PA is syntactically 
incomplete, how definitive is the standard interpretation? 
Now, in Theorem VI of his 1931 paper, Gödel essentially argues that his “undecidable” 
proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], is such that (cf. [An02b], §1.3-§1.6): 
If [(Ax)R(x)] is P-provable, then [~R(n)] is P-provable for some numeral [n]. 
Now, by standard logical axioms, we have that: 
 If [~R(n)] is P-provable for some numeral [n], then [~(Ax)R(x)] is P-provable. 
It thus follows that Gödel has essentially argued that: 
 If [(Ax)R(x)] is P-provable, then [~(Ax)R(x)] is P-provable. 
Clearly, it should now follow, by the standard Deduction Theorem of first order logic, 
that: 
 [(Ax)R(x) => ~(Ax)R(x)] is P-provable, 
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and so: 
[~(Ax)R(x)] is P-provable. 
4.2  We must conclude that PA is omega-inconsistent 
However, at this point, standard interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning appeal to his explicit 
assumption that PA is omega-consistent in order to conclude that the PA-provability of 
[~(Ax)R(x)] cannot be inferred from the above meta-argument.  
Now, unless the omega-consistency of PA has some deeper, intuitive significance 
philosophically, this is not a reasonable inference; since the Deduction Theorem is a 
fundamental theorem of classical logic, we must, using Occam’s razor, conclude from 
Gödel's reasoning, firstly, that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, and, secondly, that PA is 
omega-inconsistent (and so Gödel's Theorem VI holds vacuously [An02b]). 
We note that Wittgenstein’s remarks indicate that, prima facie, there appear no intuitively 
significant philosophical grounds for treating the omega-consistency of PA as a primitive 
concept; prima facie, there are thus no reasonable grounds for allowing it to over-ride an 
application of the Deduction Theorem.  
In sharp contrast, we note that the omega-inconsistency of PA is natural, and intuitively 
unobjectionable, under a constructive interpretation of the concept of “PA proves: 
[(Ax)F(x)]” as described earlier; under such interpretation, an omega-inconsistent PA 
does not imply that PA, or any of its interpretations, are either inconsistent, or unnaturally 
consistent (cf. [An02b], Appendix 2). It simply implies that there are arithmetical 
relations that cannot be verified uniformly by a common algorithm over the domain of 
their interpretation.  
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Moreover, as we argue in Anand ([An03c], Appendix 1), this interpretation implies that 
PA can express relations that are deterministic, yet essentially unpredictable; such a 
language would have significance for the expression of natural phenomena that are best 
described in quantum mechanical terms. 
The above suggests that it may be the absence of an adequately technical counter-
argument that leaves Wittgenstein’s viewpoint - and that of others who have shared his 
reservations - vulnerable to the arguments advanced by standard interpretations of 
Gödel's reasoning and conclusion; these implicitly imply that any interpretation of 
Gödel's reasoning and conclusion must be accepted as essentially counter-intuitive on the 
basis of purely technical considerations. 
4.3  Rosser’s argument may be invalid 
Prima facie, the standard interpretation of Gödel’s reasoning and conclusions seems 
strengthened by Rosser’s argument that Gödelian undecidability can be established in a 
simply consistent language without assuming omega-consistency. However, as shown in 
Anand ([An02a], §7.4(b)(x)(3)), if standard (text-book) expositions ([Me64], p145, 
Proposition 3.32) of Rosser’s proof can be accepted as definitive, then Rosser’s argument 
is invalid. 
5.  When does a formal assertion “mean” what it represents?  
An important philosophical issue - which does not seem to have been adequately 
addressed by standard interpretations of classical theory as yet - is implicit in the key 
thesis of Floyd and Putnam’s paper, and is reflected in Wittgenstein’s remark:  
If you assume that the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that means it is 
true in the Russell sense, and the interpretation “P is not provable” ... has to be given 
up. 
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5.1  When does a formal assertion “mean” what it represents? 
We may state this issue explicitly as:  
(*) When does a formal assertion “mean” what it represents? 
Now, if, as argued earlier, we accept that PA formalises our intuitive arithmetic M, and 
that M is the standard interpretation of PA, it follows that every well-formed formula of 
PA interprets as a well-defined arithmetical expression, and every well-defined 
arithmetical expression can be represented as a PA-formula. 
The question then arises:  
When is an arbitrary number-theoretic function or relation representable in PA? 
5.2  Formal expressibility and representability 
Classically, the question of PA-representability is addressed by the following three 
definitions (cf. [Me64], p117-118): 
(a)  A number-theoretic relation R(x1, ..., xn) is said to be expressible in PA if, and 
only if, there is a well-formed formula [A(x1, ..., xn)] of PA with n free variables 
such that, for any natural numbers k1, ..., kn: 
(i) if R(k1, ..., kn) is true, then PA proves: [A(k1, ..., kn)], 
(ii) if R(k1, ..., kn) is false, then PA proves: [~A(k1, ..., kn)], 
(b)  A number-theoretic function f(x1, ..., xn) is said to be representable in PA if, and 
only if, there is a well-formed formula [A(x1, ..., xn, y)] of PA, with the free 
variables x1, ..., xn, y, such that, for any natural numbers k1, ..., kn, l: 
(i) if f(k1, ..., kn) = l, then PA proves: [A(k1, ..., kn, l)], 
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(ii) PA proves: [(E!l)A(k1, ..., kn, l)], 
(c)  A number-theoretic function f(x1, ..., xn) is said to be strongly representable in PA 
if, and only if, there is a well-formed formula [A(x1, ..., xn, y)] of PA, with the 
free variables x1, ..., xn, y, such that, for any natural numbers k1, ..., kn, l: 
(i) if f(k1, ..., kn) = l, then PA proves: [A(k1, ..., kn, l)], 
(ii) PA proves: [(E!l)A(x1, ..., xn, y)], 
5.3  When may we assert that A(x1, ..., xn) “means” R(x1, ..., xn)? 
We can, thus, re-phrase our earlier question (*) as: 
If a number-theoretic relation R(x1, ..., xn) is expressible by a PA-formula [A(x1, ..., 
xn)], when may we assert that, under the standard interpretation, A(x1, ..., xn) “means” 
R(x1, ..., xn)? 
Now we note that, if R(x1, ..., xn) is arithmetical, then one of its PA-representation is 
[R(x1, ..., xn)]17, whose standard interpretation is R(x1, ..., xn). Hence every arithmetical 
relation is the standard interpretation of some PA-formula that expresses R(x1, ..., xn) in 
PA, and we can adapt this to give a formal definition of the term “means”: 
Definition 1: If a number-theoretic relation R(x1, ..., xn) is expressible by a PA-
formula [A(x1, ..., xn)], then we say that, under the standard interpretation, A(x1, ..., 
xn) means R(x1, ..., xn) if, and only if, R(x1, ..., xn) is the standard interpretation of 
some PA-formula that expresses R(x1, ..., xn) in PA. 
                                               
17 We note that, if R(x1, ..., xn) is PA-expressible, then there are denumerable formulas that express it in 
PA. 
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The question (*) can now be expressed precisely as: 
(**) When is a number-theoretic relation the standard interpretation of some PA-
formula that expresses it in PA? 
Now, by definition, the number-theoretic relation R(x1, ..., xn), and the arithmetic relation 
A(x1, ..., xn), can be effectively shown as equivalent for any given set of natural number 
values for the free variables contained in them. 
However, for R(x1, ..., xn) to mean A(x1, ..., xn), we must have, in addition, that R(x1, ..., 
xn) can be effectively transformed into an arithmetical expression, so that it can be the 
standard interpretation of some PA-formula that expresses it in PA. 
5.4  What is a mathematical object? 
Clearly, this implies, firstly, that we must be able to add [R] as a primitive, n-ary, relation 
letter to PA, along with suitable axioms, without inviting inconsistency; and, secondly, 
that R(x1, ..., xn) must define a unique mathematical object, where we define (cf. 
[An02c], §1.2): 
(i) Primitive mathematical object: A primitive mathematical object is any symbol 
for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter, which is defined as a 
primitive symbol of a formal mathematical language. 
(ii) Formal mathematical object: A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an 
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either a primitive 
mathematical object, or that can be introduced through definition into a formal 
mathematical language without inviting inconsistency. 
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(iii) Mathematical object: A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a 
primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object. 
Now, the logical and mathematical antinomies show that we cannot unrestrictedly assume 
that every arithmetical relation defines a mathematical object18. However, if we can 
introduce the n-ary relation letter [R] into PA as above, without inviting inconsistency, 
then we can, reasonably, assert that the relation R(x1, ..., xn) does, indeed, define a 
mathematical object in a constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable way, and that 
A(x1, ..., xn) does mean R(x1, ..., xn).  
5.5  Introduction of new symbols by definition 
Now, the question: 
When may we introduce an additional function or relation letter into PA without 
inviting inconsistency. 
is addressed classically by the following proposition (cf. [Me64], Proposition 2.29, p82): 
Proposition: Let K be a first-order theory with equality. Assume that K proves: 
[(E!u)A(u, y1, ..., yn). Let K' be the first-order theory with equality obtained by 
adding to K a new function letter f of n arguments, and the proper axiom [A(f(y1, ..., 
yn), y1, ..., yn), as well as all instances of the axioms of a first order theory involving f. 
Then there is an effective transformation mapping each well-formed formula B of K' 
into a well-formed formula B' of K such that: 
                                               
18 We note that, by defining a mathematical object precisely, the paradoxical element in the mathematical 
and logical “antinomies” is effectively eliminated; they define functions or relations that are not 
mathematical objects. Prima facie, except from a Platonic viewpoint, it thus seems of little significance 
whether such definitions are taken as defining entities that are mathematically inconsistent (square circle), 
arguably inconsistent (Pegasus), logically inconsistent (Russell’s impredicative set), or mathematical non-
objects (the range of Gödel’s primitive recursive substitution relation). 
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(a) if f does not occur in [B], then [B'] is [B]; 
(b) [(~B)'] is [~(B')]; 
(c) [(B => C)'] is [B' => C']; 
(d) [((Ax)B)'] is [(Ax)B']; 
(e) K' proves: [B <=> B']; 
(f) if K' proves: B, then K proves: B'. 
Hence, if B does not contain f, and K' proves: B, then K proves: B. 
It follows that a number-theoretic function f (or relation R, if we treat R as a Boolean 
function) may be taken to define a mathematical object if it is strongly representable in 
PA; we may then introduce the function letter [f] into PA without risking inconsistency, 
and we would then have that f(x1, ..., xn) is represented in PA by the formula [f(x1, ..., 
xn)], whose standard interpretation is f(x1, ..., xn). 
6.  Why P cannot be interpreted as “P is not provable in PA” 
6.1  A recursive number-theoretic function that is not a mathematical object 
Apart from the trivial resolution of the mathematical and logical paradoxes (footnote 18), 
the significance of the above definitions is that Gödel's primitive recursive substitution 
function, Sb(x v|y) (cf. [Go31a], definition 31, p20), is, remarkably, not a mathematical 
object! 
As we note in Anand [An02c]: 
The significance of these definitions is seen in Meta-theorem 1. We prove, there, the 
existence of an asymmetrical recursive number-theoretic relation - one that is 
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intuitively decidable constructively, but which cannot be introduced through 
definition as a formal mathematical object into any formal system of Peano 
Arithmetic without inviting inconsistency; nor, ipso facto, into any Axiomatic Set 
Theory that models19 (cf. [Me64], p192-3) such Arithmetic. Hence, it is not a formal 
mathematical object, and the range of its characteristic function20 is not a recursively 
enumerable set21! 
This is an astonishing result22! Firstly, recursive number-theoretic functions and 
relations are classically accepted as the basic building blocks for defining 
constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, mathematical objects23. Secondly, 
and in vivid contrast, the relative consistency, and independence, of the Continuum 
Hypothesis would imply, prima facie, that we may also treat Cantor’s non-
constructive cardinal, aleph1, as a valid formal mathematical object24; thus, we may 
introduce axiomatic definitions - and an individual constant symbol - for it into any 
Axiomatic Set Theory without inviting inconsistency! 
                                               
19 We follow Mendelson’s definition of a model ([Me64], p51): An interpretation is said to be a model for a 
set T of well-formed formulas of P if, and only if, every well-formed formula in T is true for the 
interpretation in the classical Tarskian sense. 
 
20 If R(x) is a relation (predicate), then the characteristic function CR(x) is defined as follows: CR(x)  = 0 if 
R(x) is true, and CR(x)  = 1 if R(x) is false ([Me64], p119). 
 
21 A recursively enumerable set is classically defined as the range of some recursive number-theoretic 
function, and is implicitly assumed consistent with any Axiomatic Set Theory that is a model for P 
([Me64], p250). 
 
22 Loosely speaking, it may be viewed as a constructive arithmetical parallel to Russell’s non-constructive, 
and seemingly paradoxical, impredicative “set” ([Me64], p2). 
 
23 See, for instance, Gödel’s remarks ([Go31a], p23, footnote 39). 
 
24 This, essentially, seems to reflect Gödel’s point of view, which he expresses in his 1947 paper, “What is 
Cantor’s continuum problem?”, whilst discussing whether Cantor’s continuum hypothesis should be added 
to set theory as a new axiom. [Kurt Gödel, Collected Works, vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 1986–2003.] 
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In other words, Meta-theorem 1 in Anand [An02c] establishes that there is no PA-
formula that can mean Sb(x v|y) under interpretation.      
6.2  No PA-formula P can interpret as “P is not provable in PA” 
Now we note that Gödel’s number-theoretic relation Bew(x) - which holds if, and only if, 
x is the Gödel-number of some PA-provable formula P - is defined ([Go31a], definition 
46, p22) in terms of his primitive recursive number-theoretical relation Sb(x v|y). It 
follows that, since the latter is not a mathematical object, neither is the former. 
Thus, there is no PA-formula that can mean Bew(x) under interpretation; ipso facto, there 
is no PA-formula that can interpret as an arithmetic assertion that is equivalent to the 
assertion “P is not provable in PA”. As we remark in Anand ([An02c], §II(3)), such an 
assertion can only be a convention, not an arguable inference. 
6.3  No PA-formula can interpret as “PA is consistent” 
It also follows that if the concept of “PA-provability”, as defined by Gödel, cannot be 
expressed in PA, then Gödel’s Theorem XI [Go31a], which asserts that the consistency of 
PA cannot be established within a consistent PA, must hold vacuously. This argument is 
discussed in detail in Anand ([An02c], §II), where we prove Theorem 2, to the effect that 
no PA-formula can mean “PA is consistent” under the standard interpretation. 
We essentially argue there that: 
If we assume that the number-theoretic sentence (Ex)(Form(x) & ~Bew(x)) ([Go31a], 
p36, footnote 63), abbreviated Wid(PA), defines the proposition “PA is consistent” in 
a constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable way25, then can we consistently 
                                               
25 In other words, this definition can be assumed equivalent to Mendelson’s classical meta-definition of 
consistency ([Me64], p37). We argue in Anand ([An02c], §II-2), albeit in a different context, that this 
assumption, too, may conceal an implicit ambiguity. 
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assume further that Wid(PA) is equivalent to the standard interpretation of some PA-
formula [Con(PA)]? 
... the latter assumption is one of the implicit meta-theses that appear to underlie 
Gödel’s proof of, and the conclusions he draws from, his Theorem XI ([Go31a], p36).  
Clearly, the reasoning in Meta-theorem 1 and Meta-lemma 2 implies that such an 
assumption is invalid26. We conclude that there is no PA-formula, Con(PA), whose 
standard interpretation is the number-theoretic assertion (Ex)(Form(x) & ~Bew(x)) - 
which is defined by Gödel as equivalent to “PA is consistent”. 
7.  Conclusion 
We conclude that standard interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning and conclusions are not 
definitive. Wittgenstein’s reservations on Gödel's interpretation of his own formal 
reasoning, as reflected in his “notorious” paragraph, and the uneasiness that academicians 
and philosophers such as Floyd and Putnam continue to sense, and express, over standard 
interpretations of Gödel's formal reasoning, must be respected as significant indicators of 
possible ambiguities that may be rooted in implicit assumptions underlying standard 
interpretations of classical foundational concepts. 
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